Was soft Brexit really ever available after June 2016? Did Remainers have a hand in bringing about the hard Brexit we ended up with? I feel the need to clear the air about something that has long festered within debates about Brexit: the ability Remainers had or didn’t have to help us end up with a soft Brexit instead of the hard Brexit we got. A lot of this centres on the indicative votes that were held in 2019 on what form of Brexit parliament wanted. It is the cause of much confusion and indeed, mischief making by Brexiters, Corbynites and even some Remainers. Therefore, it’s time to set the record straight, once and for all.
This is a very good and welcome antidote to what is in danger of becoming an accepted, but false, re-writing of the history of what happened 2017-2019. I cover some of the same ground, and made some similar points, in a blog post in December 2020 when that revisionism first began to gain ground: https://chrisgreybrexitblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/the-problems-with-if-only-debate.html
One point which is in that post, and strongly implied in yours, that needs to be emphasised is that even if the Indicative Votes had yielded a decisive outcome there was no government to enact it - and there would have needed to be, not just for one vote, but for what would then have been the months or years to turn that vote into an agreement. For all that around that time there was talk of a 'National Government', and arguably that would have been a good way forward, there wasn't the tiniest prospect of May and Corbyn (or their parties) creating one, and without their participation none could could have been formed.
Another point, which I don't make in my blog and you don't make in yours, though I do mention it in my book Brexit Unfolded, is that, despite the Lancaster House speech (and I entirely agree with your analysis of that) there was another pivotal moment in which the possibility of soft Brexit was killed off, and that was in May 2018 when the EU Withdrawal Bill was amended in the Lords to require the government to seek EFTA membership. When it came back to the Commons, Corbyn whipped his MPs to reject it. Had he not done so, there's at least the possibility that there would have been enough Tory rebels to pass it (as shown by the 'Amendment 7' rebellion the previous December, which was the reason why May had to hold the 'meaningful votes on the WA, votes which ironically were used by the ERG, who had called Amendment 7 treachery, to scupper May's deal). Of course, even if that had happened it can't be said with certainty that soft Brexit would have happened, but it was certainly possibility.
I am always surprised how many seem to cling to the idea that all was still possible in 2019.
The indicative votes were more like a "last stand" effort and woefully uncoordinated for that purpose.
I think the only realistic change to move off the path to hard Brexit has been right after the 2017 election.
With May's majority gone, it would have allowed for a change in government and thus a change in Brexit strategy.
Given the massive consequences of leaving the EU after 40+ years, the most suitable way forward in any other country would have been a "grand coalition" between Tory and Labour parties.
Not only would this have allowed to sideline hardcore positions in either party, it would have resulted in negotiation goals that an actual majority of people would have been OK with. Not ideal but acceptable.
I'm obviously alone here in making this specific distinction. The ERG Brexit Ultras are not primarily driven by immigration, for them it's the existential battle against the EU superstate and mission creep, exemplified by Maastricht and Lisbon, and ignited by Thatcher's major euroskeptic speech made in Bruges in late 80s. For them, this marked the EEC moving from what they considered a purely trade organisation which Thatcher benefitted from to the overt "ever greater union" approach, the Social Chapter, and greater French influence from neo liberal British ideas to more of a regulation model.
When Thatcher was effectively deposed, initiated by Geoffrey Howe's stabbing in the Commons directly mentioning her hobbling the UK in Europe, the current schism in the Tory party started, fermenting over 25 years to the referendum.
So unlike other EU members, UK has always had a deep philisophical strand of non membership/independence, from the socialist Left in the Labour Party pretty much all the way from the war to end with Kinnock in the mid 80s moving Labour europhile, and the Bruges Group of Tories from 90s onwards, both takes fusing thru the uber populist Farage who represented Rightist and Leftist takes (RedKIP and Lexiter). Yes, Farage could be described as a racist, and used some racist tropes over time and in the campaign, and some Brits voted on racist lines. But many also voted against EU superstate/ever closer union mission creep, and simply as a populist reaction against distant and diffident EU machinations and governance.
My take is that it was a vote to Take Back Control from Brussels...and also British elites/London/Whitehall. It was an all round vote of anger and frustration with the whole secretive globalised model of governance, yes mainly anti Brussels, but also our top heavy clunky British model of doing things.
That's why Starmer's proposed ideas to devolve from London/Whitehall to local democracy could chime with Brits at the GE, and actually represent the first divergence from the past that might not happen had we not Left the EU.
Yes, plenty of Brits voted to keep Roumanians out. But plenty also voted because for one time only they had a voice to say they disapproved of globalist and distant government.
I can understand why you'd feel that way, but I believe it's too simplistic. Maybe this is a European versus British perspective.
Tell me something. France, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Hungary are full of racists if voting patterns for Front Nationale, AfD, Sweden Democrats, PiS, Fidesz, are anything to go by.
Are you saying Britain is a more racist country than these because we voted to Leave, and these countries likely wouldn't? Because my analysis would be different.
Tbh I'd quite like Nick to chip in on this. I contend that it's too lazy to blame Leave on racism.
Well that goes back to A.15 being fired within months, way too early. Corbyn effectively wanted to fire it even earlier. I'm afraid from this premature action sprung lack of preparedness. And nothing can justify that, even any mood of discontent in the country.
Normally I look forward to reading this blog with the same eagerness I had for my weekly copy of 'Look & Learn' c. 1963. But this one has me scratching my head. Assuming this is about the meaningful votes of 2019? Theresa May's problem then was not that Labour voted against her, it was that 115 members of her own party did. Just think about that. If Labour had helped her through, how would she have presented that to the country? She whittled the rebels down to 34 on the third attempt. With half of them plus the DUP who were supposedly on a promise, May still could have got the deal. Sure, Labour opposed the deal. So did the SNP. So did the LibDems. So did the Independents. So did the Greens. The Opposition opposed.
I have seen Conservative comments that the Lancaster House speech was primarily driven/written by Mays Brexiteer advisor, Nick Timothy (now a regular Telegraph contributor). A further ancillary, but usually overlooked, point is May's health - as a severe diabetic who requires several insulin injections per day. It's quite easy to see how she might have been bullied into such a bizarre and damaging speech.
Could May's precarious health have been a crucial factor in determining our medium term economic and geopolitical future ?
Had Corbyn backed May’s deal it would have destroyed the Conservative party - but it would have destroyed Labour too, because they would have become the facilitators of Brexit and been wiped out among voters under 50
Thanks Nick, although I'm inclined to agree, I wouldn't be so certain that an indicative vote in favour of Single Market & Customs Union membership wouldn't have generated momentum for a different outcome. It would have come down to the politics, and it's probably not very likely that a May minority government with Labour (perhaps Labour rebel) support would have legislated for it...
That said, I certainly don't agree that opponents of a hard / hardest Brexit are to blame for not voting for the SM option. It certainly isn't clear or obvious that doing so would actually have helped us get there, given the political realities that you talk about, and it may have harmed efforts to get another referendum. Which, whether you think would have been a good idea or not, wasn't an obviously unattainable goal (or no more so than any other outcome).
On that note, I would like to hear more about why you think the Lib Dems were foolish to soft-pedal on their committment to revote Article 50 if they'd won the 2019 General Election. Arguably it may have helped the party to have gone 'all-in', but putting party fortunes to one side, wouldn't the outcome for the country have been similar to a new referendum rejecting Brexit after all? I suppose you could argue that the Lib Dems winning a General Election really would have required - and demonstrated - a sea change in public opinion, but there would still have a been a very large populist opposition.
This is a very good and welcome antidote to what is in danger of becoming an accepted, but false, re-writing of the history of what happened 2017-2019. I cover some of the same ground, and made some similar points, in a blog post in December 2020 when that revisionism first began to gain ground: https://chrisgreybrexitblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/the-problems-with-if-only-debate.html
One point which is in that post, and strongly implied in yours, that needs to be emphasised is that even if the Indicative Votes had yielded a decisive outcome there was no government to enact it - and there would have needed to be, not just for one vote, but for what would then have been the months or years to turn that vote into an agreement. For all that around that time there was talk of a 'National Government', and arguably that would have been a good way forward, there wasn't the tiniest prospect of May and Corbyn (or their parties) creating one, and without their participation none could could have been formed.
Another point, which I don't make in my blog and you don't make in yours, though I do mention it in my book Brexit Unfolded, is that, despite the Lancaster House speech (and I entirely agree with your analysis of that) there was another pivotal moment in which the possibility of soft Brexit was killed off, and that was in May 2018 when the EU Withdrawal Bill was amended in the Lords to require the government to seek EFTA membership. When it came back to the Commons, Corbyn whipped his MPs to reject it. Had he not done so, there's at least the possibility that there would have been enough Tory rebels to pass it (as shown by the 'Amendment 7' rebellion the previous December, which was the reason why May had to hold the 'meaningful votes on the WA, votes which ironically were used by the ERG, who had called Amendment 7 treachery, to scupper May's deal). Of course, even if that had happened it can't be said with certainty that soft Brexit would have happened, but it was certainly possibility.
Very good analysis!
I am always surprised how many seem to cling to the idea that all was still possible in 2019.
The indicative votes were more like a "last stand" effort and woefully uncoordinated for that purpose.
I think the only realistic change to move off the path to hard Brexit has been right after the 2017 election.
With May's majority gone, it would have allowed for a change in government and thus a change in Brexit strategy.
Given the massive consequences of leaving the EU after 40+ years, the most suitable way forward in any other country would have been a "grand coalition" between Tory and Labour parties.
Not only would this have allowed to sideline hardcore positions in either party, it would have resulted in negotiation goals that an actual majority of people would have been OK with. Not ideal but acceptable.
I'm obviously alone here in making this specific distinction. The ERG Brexit Ultras are not primarily driven by immigration, for them it's the existential battle against the EU superstate and mission creep, exemplified by Maastricht and Lisbon, and ignited by Thatcher's major euroskeptic speech made in Bruges in late 80s. For them, this marked the EEC moving from what they considered a purely trade organisation which Thatcher benefitted from to the overt "ever greater union" approach, the Social Chapter, and greater French influence from neo liberal British ideas to more of a regulation model.
When Thatcher was effectively deposed, initiated by Geoffrey Howe's stabbing in the Commons directly mentioning her hobbling the UK in Europe, the current schism in the Tory party started, fermenting over 25 years to the referendum.
So unlike other EU members, UK has always had a deep philisophical strand of non membership/independence, from the socialist Left in the Labour Party pretty much all the way from the war to end with Kinnock in the mid 80s moving Labour europhile, and the Bruges Group of Tories from 90s onwards, both takes fusing thru the uber populist Farage who represented Rightist and Leftist takes (RedKIP and Lexiter). Yes, Farage could be described as a racist, and used some racist tropes over time and in the campaign, and some Brits voted on racist lines. But many also voted against EU superstate/ever closer union mission creep, and simply as a populist reaction against distant and diffident EU machinations and governance.
My take is that it was a vote to Take Back Control from Brussels...and also British elites/London/Whitehall. It was an all round vote of anger and frustration with the whole secretive globalised model of governance, yes mainly anti Brussels, but also our top heavy clunky British model of doing things.
That's why Starmer's proposed ideas to devolve from London/Whitehall to local democracy could chime with Brits at the GE, and actually represent the first divergence from the past that might not happen had we not Left the EU.
Yes, plenty of Brits voted to keep Roumanians out. But plenty also voted because for one time only they had a voice to say they disapproved of globalist and distant government.
I can understand why you'd feel that way, but I believe it's too simplistic. Maybe this is a European versus British perspective.
Tell me something. France, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Hungary are full of racists if voting patterns for Front Nationale, AfD, Sweden Democrats, PiS, Fidesz, are anything to go by.
Are you saying Britain is a more racist country than these because we voted to Leave, and these countries likely wouldn't? Because my analysis would be different.
Tbh I'd quite like Nick to chip in on this. I contend that it's too lazy to blame Leave on racism.
Well that goes back to A.15 being fired within months, way too early. Corbyn effectively wanted to fire it even earlier. I'm afraid from this premature action sprung lack of preparedness. And nothing can justify that, even any mood of discontent in the country.
Normally I look forward to reading this blog with the same eagerness I had for my weekly copy of 'Look & Learn' c. 1963. But this one has me scratching my head. Assuming this is about the meaningful votes of 2019? Theresa May's problem then was not that Labour voted against her, it was that 115 members of her own party did. Just think about that. If Labour had helped her through, how would she have presented that to the country? She whittled the rebels down to 34 on the third attempt. With half of them plus the DUP who were supposedly on a promise, May still could have got the deal. Sure, Labour opposed the deal. So did the SNP. So did the LibDems. So did the Independents. So did the Greens. The Opposition opposed.
I have seen Conservative comments that the Lancaster House speech was primarily driven/written by Mays Brexiteer advisor, Nick Timothy (now a regular Telegraph contributor). A further ancillary, but usually overlooked, point is May's health - as a severe diabetic who requires several insulin injections per day. It's quite easy to see how she might have been bullied into such a bizarre and damaging speech.
Could May's precarious health have been a crucial factor in determining our medium term economic and geopolitical future ?
Had Corbyn backed May’s deal it would have destroyed the Conservative party - but it would have destroyed Labour too, because they would have become the facilitators of Brexit and been wiped out among voters under 50
Thanks Nick, although I'm inclined to agree, I wouldn't be so certain that an indicative vote in favour of Single Market & Customs Union membership wouldn't have generated momentum for a different outcome. It would have come down to the politics, and it's probably not very likely that a May minority government with Labour (perhaps Labour rebel) support would have legislated for it...
That said, I certainly don't agree that opponents of a hard / hardest Brexit are to blame for not voting for the SM option. It certainly isn't clear or obvious that doing so would actually have helped us get there, given the political realities that you talk about, and it may have harmed efforts to get another referendum. Which, whether you think would have been a good idea or not, wasn't an obviously unattainable goal (or no more so than any other outcome).
On that note, I would like to hear more about why you think the Lib Dems were foolish to soft-pedal on their committment to revote Article 50 if they'd won the 2019 General Election. Arguably it may have helped the party to have gone 'all-in', but putting party fortunes to one side, wouldn't the outcome for the country have been similar to a new referendum rejecting Brexit after all? I suppose you could argue that the Lib Dems winning a General Election really would have required - and demonstrated - a sea change in public opinion, but there would still have a been a very large populist opposition.